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Abstract:
How do such normative affectivities as 'unconditionally intrinsic goodness', 'spontaneous
compassion', 'luminosity', 'blissfulness', ' a calm and peaceful life guided by the fundamental
value of nonviolence' emerge as ultimate outcomes of a philosophy of groundlessness? Aren't
they motivated by a sort of 'will to goodness', a preferencing of one affective dimension over
others? It would seem that groundlessness for Francisco Varela and Evan Thompson doesn't
apply to the thinking of affect and desire. Despite their  claim that nihilism cannot be overcome
by assimilating groundlessness to a notion of the will, they appear not to recognize that the
positive affectivities they associate with meditative practice are, as dispositions of feeling
opposed to other dispositions, themselves forms of willing.
In The Embodied Mind,  Varela and Thompson assert that Husserl, Merleau-Ponty and
Heidegger’s phenomenologies  produce ‘after the fact’  theoretical reflections that miss the
richness of immediate concrete pre-reflective experience  as present in the here-and-now. But
Varela and Thompson’s  separating of being and becoming in their empirical approach leads
them to misread these  phenomenologists,  and as a result to mistakenly give preference to
mindfulness approaches which  fall short of the radicality of Husserl and Merleau-Ponty.  Varela
and Thompson follow Husserl’s method of reduction up to a point, stripping away acquired
concepts associated with a naive belief in the independence of  subject and object.   They don’t
complete the reduction though, allowing subject and object to occupy separate  moments.  Varela
and Thompson succeed in reducing materialist physicalism to fundamental co-dependency, but
still find it necessary to ground  intentional processes in a foundation of temporary self-inhering
objectivities (the  “arising and subsiding, emergence and decay” of transitional forms which
inhere in themselves for a moment before relating to an outside).
 Varela and Thompson found  the affectively, valuatively felt contingency of particular acts of
other-relatedness in what they presume to be a primordial  neutral point of pre-reflective
conscious auto-affective awareness.  But the phenomenologists show that attention, as a species
of intention, is sense-making, which means it is sense-changing. Attention is affectively,
valuatively and meaningfully implicated in what it attends to as co-participant in the synthesis,
creation, constitution of objects of regard. As auto-affection turns reflexively back toward itself,
what it finds is not the normative sameness and constancy of a neutral positivity( blissful, self-
less compassion and benevolence toward  all phenomena) but a newly sensing being. Mindful
self-reflexivity, expecting to find only what it put there,  instead is confronted with the self-
displacement of its being exposed to and affected by an other.  The basis of our awareness of a
world isn’t simply compassionate, empathic relational co-determinacy, but the motivated
experience of disturbing  CHANGE in relational co-determinacy.
Introduction:
Enactivism, the Subject and the Object:
The innovative nature of the psychological concepts introduced within The Embodied Mind
impelled Thompson and Varela to seek out a richer conceptual language than that available
within  cognitive science prior to the embodied turn. While the dualistic thinking of such figures
as Descartes, Locke, Hume, Leibnitz and Kant formed the philosophical basis of first generation
cognitivism, Varela and Thompson’s rejection of the Cartesian separation of  subject and object
in favor of codeterminacy, embodiment and self-organization determined both the subjective  and
the objective aspects of the  world to be groundless in themselves , that is, only meaningful in
their dynamic interplay. The new reality for science  of the loss of the Cartesian subject coupled
with the fact of a  radically interconnected world led them to incorporate ideas from two
disparate  traditions of  thought. Pragamtist and phenomenological philosophy, in particular the
work of  Merleau-Ponty and Husserl, make subject-object interdependency fundamental to
experience. And the middle way of nahayana Buddhism shows a path toward  consciousness of
universal empathic connection in a groundless world.
But while the enactive, embodied thinking of  Varela, Thompson, and Rosch(1991))  made
significant advances over the more traditional perspectives in psychology which they targeted
(1st generation cognitivism, symbolic computationalism), a number of writers have  argued that,
despite their claims to have assimilated, and even exceeded the reaches of phenomenological
insight, in relation to the work of Merleau-Ponty, Husserl and Heidegger, enactivism  fails to
depart  from  traditional philosophical assumptions in a number of respects. Their critiques focus
on the claim that Varela and Thompson’s approach to   empirical methodology and
corresponding mathematical idealizations remains within the naive attitude rather than being
consonant with a transcendentally reduced  phenomenological access to the world according to
Merleau-Ponty and Husserl.
For instance, Christopher Pollard argues that Varela and Thompson succumb to Merleau-Ponty’s
critique of the Gestaltists and  Gelb-Goldstein, by  founding relational  interdependency in a form
of  objectivist naturalism.
“Gelb and Goldstein … have never named this third term between the psychic and the
physiological, between the ‘for itself’ and the ‘in itself’  to which their analyses always led them
and which we call existence.  Hence their earliest works often fall back on the traditional
dichotomy of  body and consciousness (p.140n)” (Merleau-Ponty and Embodied cognitive
science,  Christopher Pollard).
Furthermore, Varela’s attempt to translate Husserl’s notions of internal and absolute time into the
naturalized language of complex non-linear dynamical systems doesn't succeed in thinking
beyond third person clock time and formal geometrical notions of space. (Francisco Varela’s
neurophenomenology  of time: temporality of consciousness  explained? Esteban Vargas, Andrés
Canales-Johnson, Claudio Fuentes)
In my own work(See The Meaning of Feeling(2011),http://www.janushead.org/12-1/soffer.pdf), I
have argued that, in comparison with certain phenomenological approaches, the capacity of
enactivism to depict a meaning-making organization generating thoroughgoing affectation,
interaction and novelty may be hampered by the reliance on a notion of psycho-biological and
interpersonal entities as discrete states. Residing within each of the myriad temporary subagents
and bits comprising a psychological system is a supposed literal, albeit near-meaningless,
identity. While the role of identity in enctivism is less prominent than in classical cognitivist
frameworks (it replaces the idea of a centralized, self-present identity with that of a reciprocal
system of contextually changing states distributed ecologically as psychologically embodied and
socially embedded), I have alleged that their failure to banish the lingering notion of a literal, if
fleeting, status residing within the parts of a psycho-bio-social organization may be responsible
for the covering over of a rich, profoundly intricate process of change within the assumed frozen
space of each part.
What could be the basis of my claim that  Varela and Thompson treat the parts of a psychological
organization as ossified centers resistant to novelty, considering that the dynamical properties of
enactive embodied systems  specifically determine psychological processes as
non-representational and non-decoupleable  variables changing continuously, concurrently and
interdependently over  time?
The issue here centers on the understanding of the phenomenological experience of time, the
philosophical discussion of which has been ongoing since Aristotle. Varela(1999b)) recognizes
that the present is not properly understood as an isolated ‘now’ point; it involves not just the
current event but also the prior context framing the new entity. We don’t hear sequences of notes
in a piece of music as isolated tones but recognize them as elements of an unfolding context. As
William James wrote:”...earlier and later are present to each other in an experience that feels
either only on condition of feeling both together” (Essays In Philosophy(1978)  p.77).
The key question is how this ‘both together’ is to be construed. Is the basis of change within a
bodily organization, interpersonal interaction, and even the phenomenal experience of time itself,
the function of a collision between a separately constituted subjective context and present
objects, or is it instead an interweaving of a subject and object already changed by each other,
radically interbled or interaffected?  I contend that for Varela and Thompson it is the former, that
they conceive the ‘both-together’ of the pairing of subject and object as a conjunction of separate,
adjacent moments. I am not suggesting that these phases are considered as unrelated, only that
they each are presumed to carve out their own temporary identities.
This  thematic appears within Varela and Thompson’s  psychological approach as a linkage of
self-affection to an embodied neural organization of reciprocally causal relations among
non-decoupleable parts or subprocesses. While these components interact constantly
(Varela(1996b) says “...in brain and behavior there is never a stopping or dwelling cognitive
state, but only permanent change punctuated by transient [stabilities] underlying a momentary
act”(p.291) , it doesn’t seem as if one could go so far as to claim that the very SENSE of each
participant in a neural organization is intrinsically and immediately dependent on the meanings
of the others. I suggest it would be more accurate to claim that each affects and is affected by the
others as a collision of temporary bodies. Varela(1999a) offers "...lots of simple agents having
simple properties may be brought together, even in a haphazard way, to give rise to what appears
to an observer as a purposeful and integrated whole"(p.52 ). The bare existence of each of these
agents may be said to PRECEDE its interaction with other agents, in that each agent occupies
and inheres in its own state, presenting its own instantaneous properties for a moment, apart
from, even as it is considered conjoined to, the context which conditions it and the future which
is conditioned by it.
Mindfulness and the Living Present:
My aim in this paper is to show how  Varela and Thompson’s  separating of being and becoming
into discrete moments in their empirical approach leads them to misread Husserl and Merleau-
Ponty’s phenomenological models, and as a result to mistakenly give preference to  mindfulness
approaches which, while in many respects  consonant with the pragmatism of Dewey , James and
Putnam,  fall short of the radicality of Husserl and Merleau-Ponty.
What  do Varela and Thompson  think mindfulness approaches have to offer that the
phenomeologidal thinking of Husserl, Merleau-Ponty and Heidgger cannot provide? They assert
that Husserl, Merleau-Ponty and Heidegger’s accounts produce ‘after the fact’  theoretical
reflections that miss the richness of immediate concrete pre-reflective experience  as present in
the here-and-now.
“Husserl's turn toward experience and "the things themselves" was entirely theoretical, or, to
make the point the other way around, it completely lacked any pragmatic dimension.” “Indeed,
this criticism would hold even for Heidegger's existential phenomenology, as well as for
Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology of lived experience. Both stressed the pragmatic, embodied
context of human experience, but in a purely theoretical way.”  (Embodied Mind)
Varela and Thompson’s claim that  Buddhist-originating practices of mindful awareness
reorientate experiencing  from a phenomenological ‘after the fact’ theoretical stance to the
immediate here and now  centers on its techniques of attentive meditation.
Let’s take a look at  the structural features and affective implications of  Varela and Thompson’s
interpretation of mindful attention in relation to Merleau-Ponty, Husserl and Heidegger ‘s
accounts of  primordial consciousness.
Varela and Thompson distinguish two stages of meditation:
Mindful meditation selectively directs attention to either the focused observing of particular
objects(concentrating the mind) or to a non-object centered  panoramic perspective, a reflexive
turning toward the “very nature of consciousness”.
Traditionally, texts talk about two stages of practice: calming or taming the mind (Sanscrit:
shamatha) and the development of insight (Sanscrit: vipashyana). Shamatha, when used as a
separate practice, is in fact a concentration technique for learning to hold ("tether" is the
traditional term) the mind to a single object.. The purpose of calming the mind in Buddhism is
not to become absorbed but to render the mind able to be present with itself long enough to gain
insight into its own nature and functioning.” (Embodied Mind)
It is the  insight  stage that  forms the core of Varela and Thompson’s claims for the ethical force
of mindfulness. The following are some of the structural-formal  features of this stage of supreme
contemplative consciousness that Varela and Thompson mention:
  infinite, eternal, non-conceptual, internal, sheer awareness, no sensory objects,  sustained
attention to the here and now, mindful awareness as panoramic perspective, essential nature,
transcending existence and non-existence, free of conceptual mediation, non-intentional (non
object-directedness), self-reflexive, self-luminous, undifferentiated awareness, no sense of
distinct subject aware of a distinct object,  non-reflective and open  awareness, free of thoughts
and images,  intense mindfulness of what arises from moment to moment in the mind
 to undo conditioned habits.
Implicit in Varela and Thompson’s mindfulness account is a theory of attention. Contemplative
attending is a neutral observational gaze occurring prior to and separate from intendings of
specific objects, but which provides the primordial condition of possibility for all  intentional
acts, habits, objectivities.
“...meditation is thought to support a “bare attention”, or “passive observational stance”,
unobtrusive enough to avoid disturbing target experiences or coloring their description with
theoretical preconceptions” (Thompson, Lutz and Cosmelli, 2005, pp. 69-75).
Mindful meditations is “paying attention in a particular way: on purpose, in the present moment,
and non-judgmentally” (Kabat-Zinn 1994, p. 4).
” Mindfulness registers experiences, but it does not compare them. It does not label them or
categorize them. It just observes everything as if it was occurring for the first time. It is not
analysis which is based on reflection and memory. It is, rather, the direct and immediate
experiencing of whatever is happening, without the medium of thought. It comes before thought
in the perceptual process (Gunaratana, 2002, p. 168).  (Davis and Thompson)
“...with the full achievement of Samatha, one disengages the attention from the previous
meditative object, and the entire continuum of one’s attention is focused single-pointedly,
non-conceptually, and internally in the very nature of consciousness.... Only the aspects of sheer
awareness, clarity, and joy of the mind appear, without the intrusion of any sensory objects
(Wallace, 1999, p. 182).  (Thompson, Empathy and Consciousness, 2001)
Varela and Thompson’s dissatisfaction with the phenomenologies of Husserl, Merleau-Ponty and
Heidegger stems from their belief that  phenomenology begins from  intentional  and reflective
acts as derived and secondary constructions built on top of  the immediate neutral pre-
objectifying awareness  performed by the act of mindful attention. Phenomenological approaches
can only indirectly point to this immediacy ‘from the outside’ via theoretical reflective and
intentive modes.  Intentionality is the formation of conditioned habit, and attention is the mind’s
immediate access to the field of experience prior to the construction of causal relations. Varela
and Thompson’s belief that the neutral observational  awareness of groundlessness afforded by
mindfulness techniques gives immediate access to the here and now makes mindfulness  an
observation  rather than a creation mechanism. That is to say, meditative attention  gives neutral
access to the immediate richness of changeable experience without itself comprising a
constitutive, sense-making  activity. It is instead a sense-observing process.
Husserl and Merleau-Ponty on Attention:
Contrary to Varela and Thomson’s assertions concerning the primacy of neutral attention,
Husserl’s and Merleau-Ponty’s discussions of the philosophical history of the concept of
attention would appear to place Varela and Thompson’s theory of attention within the context of
empiricist and idealist  orientations put into question by phenomenology.
In their depiction of an independence between  the objects of awareness and the mind’s attending
to it via a neutral re-objectifying observational stance, Varela and Thompson share features with
empiricist(sensualist) and idealist(intellectualist) philosophical approaches to the concept of
attention.
Merleau-Ponty states:
“We must now show that its intellectualist [idealist] antithesis is on the same level as
empiricism itself. Both take the objective world as the object of their analysis, when this comes
first neither in time nor in virtue of its meaning; and both are incapable of expressing the
peculiar way in which perceptual consciousness constitutes its object. Both keep their distance
in relation to perception, instead of sticking closely to it. This may be shown by studying the
history of the concept of attention.”
“...in a consciousness which constitutes everything, or rather which eternally possesses the
intelligible structure of all its objects, just as in empiricist consciousness which constitutes
nothing at all, attention remains an abstract and ineffective power, because it has no work to
perform. Consciousness is no less intimately linked with objects of which it is unheeding than
with those which interest it, and the additional clearness brought by the act of attention does not
herald any new relationship. It therefore becomes once more a light which does not change its
character with the various objects which it shines upon, and once more empty acts of attention
are brought in, in place of ‘the modes and specific directions of intention’.(Cassirir)
Merleau-Ponty explains that to attend to any experience  is not merely to shine a neutral light on
it, but to articulate  a new sense, the ‘active constitution of a new object’. It is to identify a new
figure and in doing so, to transform the   sense of the previous figure along with its background.
“Attention, therefore,  as   a general  and formal  activity, does  not exist.” Rather than there
being a general capacity for  neutral observation, a universal kind of attention necessary for any
moment of consciousness, “it is literally a question of creation. “ “Attention is “a change of the
structure of consciousness,  the establishment of a new dimension of experience, the setting
forth of an a priori... To pay attention is not merely further to elucidate pre-existing data, it is to
bring about a new articulation of them by taking them as figures. “
“The miracle of consciousness consists in its bringing to light, through attention, phenomena
which re-establish the unity of the object in a new dimension at the very moment when they
destroy it. Thus attention is neither an association of images, nor the return to itself of thought
already in control of its objects, but the active constitution of a new object which makes
explicit and articulate what was until then presented as no more than an indeterminate horizon.”
Husserl, like  Merleau-Ponty , sees attention as an  intentive act of creation rather than “a light
which does not change its character with the various objects which it shines upon.”
“Attention is one of the chief themes of modern psychology. Nowhere does the
predominantly sensualistic [empiricist] character of modern psychology show itself more
strikingly than in the treatment of this theme, for not even the essential connection between
attention and intentionality-- this fundamental fact: that attention of every sort is nothing
else than a fundamental species of intentive modifications-- has ever, to my knowledge,
been emphasized  before.”
“Dazed by the confusion between object and mental content, one forgets that the objects of
which we are ‘conscious’, are not simply in consciousness as in a box, so that they can
merely be found in it and snatched at in it; but that they are first constituted as being what
they are for us, and as what they count as for us, in varying forms of objective
intention...One forgets that.... an intending, or reference  is present, that aims at an object, a
consciousness is present that is the consciousness of  this object. The mere existence of a
content in the psychic interplay is, however, not at all this being-meant or being-referred-to.
This first arises when this content is ‘noticed’, such notice being a look directed towards it,
a presentation of it. To define the presentation of a content as the mere fact of its being
experienced, and in consequence to give the name ‘presentations’ to all experienced
contents, is one of the worst conceptual distortions known to philosophy.”(Ideas I).
The co-dependent, embodied nature of the enactive mind would seem to insulate mindful
attention from Husserl’s and Merleau-Ponty’s critiques of sensualist and idealist approaches to
attention.  Varela and Thompson have insisted  that the meditative mind that is attending to the
rising and passing away of temporary forms is not a box  in the sense of a Cartesian theater in
which contents  display themselves before a  passive onlooker .  On the contrary, with regard to
concentrated attention,  they have pointed to the conditioning effect of selective attention on
objective appearance. For instance, concentrated attention on the thought of an object can have
an anticipatory effect, ‘priming’ the  perceived object  for more rapid identification, while
focused attention can  determine which of two competing images will be seen, and for how long,
in  binocular rivalry studies (From the Five Aggregates to Phenomenal Consciousness. Towards a
Cross-Cultural Cognitive Science. Jake H. Davis and Evan Thompson).
But  these examples concern the use of attention to alter the circumstances of the appearance of
content whose constitution cannot be said to be inseparable from the act of attention itself.
Specifically in the case of non-object directed attention, according to Varela and Thompson
intentional acts are not involved, there is no ‘aiming at’  objects. The mind’s attention to the
FACT of irreducible inter-determinacy (pre-reflective reflexive auto-affection) and change in the
SENSE of embodiment over time (through reflective and  intentional  acts of selective attention)
are treated as distinct and separable moments, with the latter being constituted out of the former
in a second step of aiming at objects.   To the extent that non-intending , non-object- oriented
primordial awareness  is not implicated in, that is, does not participate directly in the moment to
moment  constituting and re constituting of the sense of what arises and passes away, and instead
maintains itself as a distanced neutrality, it encapsulates and totalizes this experience of arising
and passing away in an idealism.
For Husserl, concentrated attention does not simply prime, select, reinforce or condition the
appearance of objects. Rather, the  focused attention on an object is a synthesis of creative acts
which first  constitute and then continue to alter the nature of the object that is being ‘noticed’.
The  object in itself is  transcendent, never seen as an actual whole, but rather from moment to
moment as  a changing concatenation of retentional memory, protentional anticipation and
impressions of immediate sense. Turning toward and  heeding an object implies a belief in its
continuity, a continuity which is nothing other than this constantly changing flow of sensations
synthetically held together as unitary via memory and anticipation. Thus, the initial  ‘turning
toward’ an object  is already a synthetic act of constitution. Attention, as a species of intention, is
sense-making, which means it is sense-changing. Attention is affectively, valuatively and
meaningfully implicated in what it attends to as co-participant in the synthesis, creation,
constitution of objects of regard..
“ We are continuously directed toward the object itself; we execute the uninterrupted consciousness of
experiencing it. The consciousness of its existence is here a belief in act; by virtue of the accord in
which the perceptive appearances flow off in original presentation, retention, and protention, an
accord of continuous self-affirmation, belief is continuous certainty of belief, which has its certainty
in this originality of the object in its living being-present.”(Experience and Judgement)
Attention involves itself in the co-creation of sense as a striving, an intending beyond itself.
“ In general, attention is a tending of the ego toward an intentional object, toward a unity which
“appears” continually in the change of the modes of its givenness and which belongs to the essential
structure of a specific act of the ego (an ego-act in the pregnant sense of the word); it is a
tending-toward in realization.
“...in the continuity of the experience of the object, there is an intention which goes beyond the
given and its momentary mode of givenness and tends toward a progressive plus ultra. It is not only
a progressive having-consciousness-of but a striving toward a new consciousness in the form of an
interest in the enrichment of the “self” of the object which is forthcoming eo ipso with the
prolongation of the apprehension. Thus the tendency of the turning-toward continues as a tendency
toward complete fulfillment.““the inception of an act of turning-toward, of paying attention to what
exists, puts into play an activity with a tendency, a striving. It is a striving toward realization, a
doing which includes different forms of discontinuance and completion.”(Experience and
Judgement)
Derrida captures the primordial  nature of awareness  as sense’s intending  ahead of itself in the
following passages:“The coincidence between the constituting and the constituted moments  is
“the absolute unity of sense’s movement, i .e. , the unity of the noncoincidence and of the
indefinite co implication of the constituted and constituting moments in the absolute identity of a
Living Present that dialectically projects and maintains itself.”
The living present as the absolute of intentionality “is passage, wherein every adventure is a
change of direction [conversion ] and every return to the origin an audacious  move toward the
horizon.” “Being “is a "sense, " a teleological ought-to-be which constitutes being as
movement”(Introduction to Husserl’s Origin of Geometry)
 Heidegger also speaks of the intentional structure of motivated  attending to as a letting oneself
be affected, being-ahead-of-oneself (the moment of awareness as foreign and familiar at the same
time). “One cannot construct being-in-the-world from willing, wishing, urge, and propensity as
psychical acts.”(Zollikon).The desire for this conversation is determined by the task I have before
me. This is the motive, the "for the sake of which" [ Weswegen]. The determining factor is not an
urge or a drive, driving and urging me from behind, but something standing before me, a task I
am involved in, something I am charged with. This, in turn—this relation to something I am
charged with—is possible only if I am "ahead" [vorweg] of myself.” (Zollikon).  This relation
with something standing before me isn’t my passive observing of  an object passing through my
field of  awareness, but a meeting between what confronts me and what I project ahead of me
from my having been. My intending isn’t a theoretical but a temporal process underlying   the
neutrality of passive attention, and revealing the latter as a naive (inauthentic) mode of
awareness.
How would  Husserl reinterpret the notion of mindful attention as “ the acknowledgment and
acceptance as it is,  of each thought, feeling, or sensation that arises in the attentional field”?
(Bishop, Lau et al. 2004, p. 232).” ).
As a phenomenological process, the achievement of such a condition of mind  involves acts of
reflection and abstractive intention constituting a relational totality out of separately experienced
parts, events, objects. The acknowledging and accepting of each particular takes place as  a series
of constitutive steps , beginning with a change of interest away from the  grasping of each
particular, toward an abstracting  away of everything meaningful about the parts except their
belonging to a relational whole. The achievement of this whole requires a reflective, retentive-
protentive holding together of past parts simultaneously with newly appearing ones. Whereas for
Varela and Thompson, this  panoramic awareness of co-determinacy is the primordial basis of
consciousness in general(“the very nature of consciousness”), for Husserl arriving at the
consciousness of groundlessness only achieves a partial reduction of naturalism. Varela and
Thompson follow Husserl’s method of reduction up to a point, stripping away acquired  concepts
associated with a naive belief in the independence of  subject and object from each other.   They
don’t complete the reduction though, allowing subject and object to occupy separate  moments.
As a result, the achieving of Varela and Thompson’s optimal state of ‘sheer’ groundless
awareness is the attainment of an intentionally based empiricism. That is to say, Varela and
Thompson have succeeded in reducing materialist physicalism to fundamental co-dependency,
but still find it necessary to root  intentional processes in a foundation of temporary self-inhering
objectivities (the  “arising and subsiding, emergence and decay” of transitional forms which
inhere in themselves for a moment before relating to an outside).
“in the logic of Darwin's account of evolution and the Buddhist analysis of experience into co-
dependent arising, we are concerned with the processual transformation of the past into the future
through the intermediary of transitional forms that in themselves have no permanent substance.”
(Embodied Mind). Husserl’s admonition to Franz Brentano may be apropos here:
“Anyone who misconstrues the sense and performance of transcendental phenomenological
reduction is still entangled in psychologism; he confounds intentional psychology and
transcendental phenomenology.. he falls a victim to the inconsistency of a transcendental
philosophy that stays within the natural realm.”(Cartesian Meditations, p.86).
A thoroughgoing phenomenological reduction would reveal the ‘sheer awareness’ of   the ‘very
nature of consciousness’ as the object of an intentional noesis that, in this act of sense, is at the
same time striving, intending beyond itself toward a more unitary fulfillment. No reduction is
complete without including this anticipative self-exceeding within any act of awareness.
Furthermore, as an intention, the sense act which makes appear the relational whole is temporal,
meaning that from one moment to the next new sense acts supercede it. Thus, each moment each
new act of ‘sheer awareness’ has its retentive and reflective background in the form of
immediately previous, but not identical, acts of sheer awareness. There is no immediate
panoramic experience of the groundless whole that maintains itself over time without resting on a
changing reflective referential basis.  In short, the experience of ‘neutral’ attention unfolds as
intentional activity whose objective sense of ‘neutrality’, ‘accepting’ and ‘acknowledging’ will
subtly , or not so subtly(depending on circumstances), shift meaningfully, valuatively and
affectively from moment to moment in the ongoing flow of temporally constitutive  intentional
synthesis.  Any vantage claiming to be both an  immediate pre-reflective experiencing of the ever
changing ‘now’ and  neutrally observational exposes itself as  naive.
What Varela and Thompson recognize about the shortcomings  of the Cartesian self can be
turned back against their depiction of immediacy of awareness as reflexive and inhering in itself
as auto-affection.
“If there were a solid, really existing self hidden in or behind the aggregates, its
unchangeableness would prevent any experience from occurring; its static nature would make the
constant arising and subsiding of experience come to a screeching halt.” (Embodied Mind)
Just as there is no solid self, there is no neutral, panoramic vantage from which we can totalize
the changeableness (constant arising and subsiding) of experience. The contemplative
experiencing of co-dependent relating is, from moment to moment, itself a unitary meaning or
sense (with concrete, affective and valuative dimensions),  as THIS panoramic sense of relational
co-determinacy.  It is an intentional act, and  therefore intends beyond itself into new sense in
every moment of its instantiation. If this were not the case, if the transformative impetus of the
‘intending beyond itself’ were not allowed to insert itself in the very heart of contemplative
neutrality, self-reflexivity and  internality, then the contemplative insight  of endless relational
changeability would   reduce to pure identity. Varela and Thompson say mindfulness is about
opening oneself to  practical immediate embodied activity and change, but they found actual
activity on a totalizing  ideal of activity based on the idealized  ‘nows’ of neutral clock time.
What Merleau-Ponty says about the ‘in-itself’ empirical object may apply equally  to Varela and
Thompson’s ‘for-itself’ mindful subjectivity as sheer  self-reflexivity self-luminousity, and
peaceful rest in itself.
Thompson writes “for the Advaitins, cognition consists in a reflexive awareness of its own
occurrence as an independent prerequisite for the cognition of objects (Ram-Prasad 2007). In
other words, the defining feature of cognition is reflexivity or self-luminosity, not intentionality
(object-directedness), which is adventitious.“(Dreamless Sleep, the Embodied Mind, and
Consciousness,2015)
In contrast to these sentiments, Merleau-Ponty argues:
 “...the identity of the thing with itself, that sort of established position of its own, of rest in itself,
that plenitude and that positivity that we have recognized in it already exceed the experience, are
already a second interpretation of the experience...we arrive at the thing-object, at the In Itself, at
the thing identical with itself, only by imposing upon experience an abstract dilemma which
experience ignores”(p.162)“The relation between what I see and I who see is not one of immediate
or frontal contradiction; the things attract my look, my gaze caresses the things, it espouses their
contours and their reliefs, between it and them we catch sight of a complicity” (The Visible and the
Invisible, p. 76)
Mindful Attention and Primordial Value Feeling:
Having delineated the differences between mindfulness thinking on attention and that of Husserl
and Merleau-Ponty, we are now in a position to understand the basis of the affective, valuative
and ethical claims that Varela and Thompson make concerning the outcome of  proper
immersion in mindfulness. They provocatively assert  that a thoroughgoing understanding of the
decenteredness of personhood,  and of reality as a whole, can lead, through the use of
contemplative practice of mindfulness, to the awareness of universal empathy, compassion and
benevolence.
‘In Buddhism, we have a case study showing that when groundlessness is embraced and followed
through to its ultimate conclusions, the outcome is an unconditional sense of intrinsic goodness that
manifests itself in the world as spontaneous compassion.”(Thompson, Neurophenomenology and
Contemplative Experience) “Our natural impulse  is one of compassion, but it has been obscured by
habits of ego-clinging like the sun obscured by a passing cloud. “(Embodied Mind)
Sebastjian Voros articulates this in the following way:
“ Someone who has realized  the emptiness of things (sunyata), i.e. who has directly experienced
that things have no  independent existence, but emerge in mutual co-determination, will be
permeated with boundless compassion (karuna); and someone who has realized boundless
compassion  (karuna) towards all sentient beings, will grasp the emptiness of all things (sunyata).”
(Voros 2014)
“The chasm of the groundless ground – of the dialectical betwixt – that  opens up in such practices
can be terrifying at first, but is ultimately comprehended as the  existential wellspring of boundless
compassion and limitless peace. When there are no more  boundaries between myself and the other
– when I am the other and the other is me – there can  be no animosity, hatred, or anxiety between
us. This is the crux of St. Augustine’s famous  saying: Ama, et fac quod vis (Love, and do what you
will). Love – understood in terms of the  Christian selfless love (agape), analogous to Buddhist
compassion (karuna) – is the cohesive  force of interbeing, the (groundless) ground of genuine peace
and co-existence. “(Voros 2014)
The optimal state of mindful awareness  manifests and expresses itself  by a chain of  valuative-
affective-ethical sentiments that include:
unconditional, intrinsic, spontaneous compassion and benevolence,  fundamental warmth toward
the phenomenal world, concern for the welfare of others beyond mere naive compassion,  joy and
of the mind, quiescent, blissful, peaceful and tranquil sentience, guided by the fundamental value
of nonviolence .
How do Varela and Thompson get from groundlessness of self to such positive valuations as
selfless compassion?  We can derive  these affective and valuative modes of sensing directly
from the supposed  neutrality of the mindfully attentive gaze (“ the acknowledgement and
acceptance of each thought and feeling that arises within the attentional field” (Bishop, Lau et al.
2004, p. 232).
The first observation we can make is that, while on the one hand attention is affectively and
valuatively neutral and, on the other hand benevolent compassion is affectively  positive, the
positive values achieved through mindful awareness share with attention a constancy of valuative
tone.    Attentional neutrality is not the absence of affective sense but a particular mode of
valuative sensing that is presumed to perpetuate itself.  What gives mindful awareness the
temporal constancy of its valuative positivity is the same feature that allows for the supposed
ongoing neutrality of the attentive gaze.  As we have seen, Varela and Thompson split off the
attentive regard from the objects of its regard,  according  subjective attention and objective
appearing their own moment of  neutral self-inherence as for-itself and in-itself.   For Varela and
Thompson the mind’s attention to the FACT of irreducible inter-determinacy (pre-reflective
reflexive auto-affection) and change in the SENSE of embodiment over time (through reflective
and  intentional  acts) are treated as distinct and separable moments.
We can connect  Thompson’s depiction of the meditating mind reposing, “awake and alert, in the
sheer ‘luminosity' of consciousness (its quality of non-reflective and open awareness), without
attending exclusively to any particular object or content” with his  empirical description of pre-
reflective consciousness:
“The fact that there is felt experience—the fact that there is something it is like for the
subject—depends on the basic alerting function [distinct from the higher-level mechanisms of
selective attention that come into play in determining what one is conscious of]. In contrast, the
particular contents of consciousness—what it is like for the subject—depends also on how this
consciousness is directed to particular objects and properties through selective attention. Put
another way, the particular contents of phenomenal state consciousness can be seen as
modifications or modulations of a basal level of creature consciousness dependent on the alerting
function (see also Searle, 2000)).”(Davis and Thompson 2015)
Arriving at mindfulness from everyday modes of awareness  is an achievement and the result of a
training process, but once this mode of consciousness has been attained, the ongoing flow  of
compassionate , non-objectifying awareness is not considered as being in itself the continued
goal-directedness of an intentional  achievement. In other words, one must work toward the goal
of getting back to the natural state of being that one has drifted away from through ego-clinging
habits. Because  the boundless empathy of  integrative ideality  is presupposed as preceding and
underpinning the possibility of all intentional acts, residing in this manner of originary awareness
is not a dwelling within intentionality and achievement-orientation, but an empty,  goal-less  self-
reflexive movement of thought (non-intentional and non object-directed),  a constant background
thematic and valuative-affective tone which does not change its positive sense(empathetic and
peaceful) over time, just as attention does not lose its distanced neutrality over time as it observes
the constantly changing particularities that flow into and out of the now of awareness .
If we subject Varela and Thompson’s dualism of ‘fact of consciousness’ and ‘intentional sense’
of awareness to a Husserlian reduction, we get the following:
It is one thing to say along with Merleau-Ponty, Heidegger and Husserl , that co-determinacy  is
primordially built into the structure of awareness .  It’s another thing to claim that a particular
valuative tone (the neutrality of the sheer fact of what it is like, or the self-reflexive positivity of
compassion) is essentially,  normatively associated with this primordial structure of awareness.
Where Varela and Thompson find only the FACT of irreducible inter-determinacy at the core of
primordial awareness, Husserl reduces this supposed constant ongoing essence to the temporality
of a momentary intentional act determined via a unique object and manner of givenness .
“ In the essence of the mental process itself lies not only that it is consciousness but also whereof
it is consciousness, and in which determinate or indeterminate  sense it is that.(Ideas I)”,
For Husserl,  a specific shift in interest is involved in generating the positive valuative regard of
selfless compassionate, benevolent, joyful feelings toward others. This shift in sense involves a
specific achievement, a move from a lesser sense of relational intimacy to that of greater
relational interdependency.  Affectivities such as 'unconditionally intrinsic goodness',
'spontaneous compassion', 'luminosity', 'blissfulness', ' a calm and peaceful life guided by the
fundamental value of nonviolence' are normative valuations  motivated by a sort of 'will to
goodness'(the goodness of interdependence), a preferencing of one affective experience
(totalizing integrative unity) over others (disconnection and isolation).  In order for an awareness
of co-determinacy to maintain itself as positive affectivity , it must think itself as more, and other
than,  the self-reflexive repetition of the initial achievement of this state of being. It must
continue to strive, aim to achieve,  intend beyond itself .  As I argued previously with regard to
attention,  the experience of co-determinacy unfolds as  intentional activity whose objective sense
of ‘peaceful benevolence’ and empathy will subtly , or not so subtly(depending on
circumstances), shift meaningfully, valuatively, affectively from moment to moment in the
ongoing flow of temporally constitutive  intentional synthesis.
If for Varela and Thompson there is no subject object independence,  for phenomenology there is
no co-dependent  unity without vector of elsewhere defining the unity as a unity beyond itself.
Varela and Thompson’s positive valuative-affective-ethical terms recognize and celebrate only
relation, integrity, reciprocity, interdependence, belonging. Phenomenology recognizes   the fact
that groundless interdependence and relationality are only possible as a disturbing renewal.
Meaning, as existing, is an exiting from itself. As Merleau-Ponty says:
“ In all uses of the word sens, we find the same fundamental notion of a being orientated or
polarized in the direction of what he is not, and thus we are always brought back to a conception of
the subject as ek-stase, and to a relationship of active transcendence between the subject and the
world.” (Phenomenology of Perception, p.499).
 “Action is, by definition, the violent transition from what I have to what I aim to have, from what I
am to what I intend to be.”, “When I say that I know and like  someone, I aim, beyond his qualities,
at an inexhaustible ground which may one day shatter the image that I have formed of him. This is
the price for there being things and ‘other people’ for us, not as the result of some illusion, but as
the result of a violent act which is perception itself. “ (Phenomenology of Perception, p.444)). “
Would Merleau-Ponty want us to believe there is an awareness (the mere fact of what it is like )
expressed as  peaceful, blissful compassion (sheer luminosity, non-attentive to particular objects)
that founds the violence of perception? On the contrary, I think Merleau-Ponty would insist that
his gestalt-based, ‘same world for everyone’ can be seen as only manifesting itself in primordial
awareness as a pre-reflective  feeling of being alive if we understand  that feeling of the living
present as a departure as well as an arrival, as an exposure and a violation, as a being-connected-
with compassionately that disturbs a prior order of intimacy and connection.  In other words, not
a subjective moment of connection subtending difference but a simultaneously subjective and
objective difference-in-connection, which is another word for striving, motive, affectivity,
passage, transit, signification, temporality , history.
From this vantage the ‘middle way’ is less an overcoming of dualism than a re-situating of it as a
subjective totalization of dialectical relationality.
 It is instructive to compare the mindful ethic of  ‘concern for the welfare of others beyond
merely naive compassion’ with Heidegger’s concept of primordial care . Heideggerian Care is
not warmth, nor is it positive concern, compassion or benevolence. Care is ‘taking care of’, being
in  relevant relationality with something or someone, and presupposes and implies all variants of
mood and affective comportment. Heideggerian care, as desire for the other, is a relation to the
other composed of  anticipation and loss, connection and disconnection, disclosure and
concealment. Heidegger describes the care structure as something being understood with regard
to something else. This relation is a  "confrontation that understands, interprets, and articulates,
[and] at the same time takes apart what has been put together"(Being and Time). If we apply this
thinking to Varela and Thompson’s mindfully aware unity of differences, we see that they
recognize the  putting-together (as Voros 2014 put it,  “When there are no more  boundaries
between myself and the other – when I am the other and the other is me – there can  be no
animosity, hatred, or anxiety between us”) ,  but ignore the   taking-apart, the dislocation with
respect to the previous moment’s awareness of relationality. From this vantage, it would appear
that Varela and Thompson’s notion of compassionate concern as positive sentiment is what
Heidegger’s care is meant to unravel and complicate.
In their complicity with the supposed self-constancy of  neutral non-preferential, non-intentional
attentional awareness, (satipa..hna functions to decrease affective biases of attention and
memory towards pleasant as well as unpleasant stimuli,(Davis and Thompson 2015)) , mindful
compassion, benevolence and generosity  essentialize and privilege one pole (the ‘goodness’ and
‘bliss’ of unity) of the primordially relational basis of experience over the objective pole of
foreignness and dislocation.  Varela and Thompson  ground  the affectively, valuatively felt
contingency of particular acts of other-relatedness in what they presume to be a primordial
neutral point of pre-reflective conscious auto-affective awareness. .  But the phenomenologists
show that as auto-affection turns reflexively back toward itself, what it finds is not the normative
sameness and constancy of a neutrality or  positivity, but the surprise of a newly sensing being.
Put differently, self-reflexivity, expecting to find only what it put there,   instead is confronted
with the self-displacement of its being exposed to and affected by an other.
 What mindfulness ignores in empathy is that  primordial  phenomenological  relationality is split
within itself as a becoming beyond itself. For Husserl, this split  takes the form of the foreignness
to self of what affects the ego as object.  For  Merleau-Ponty it is the violence of perceptual
ek-stase, while Heidegger conceives it as  the anxious uncanniness of  destabilizing Being-with-
others. For all three writers the particularization of  self-other relationality as always a new
relation renders  com-passion as at the same time a form of alienation.
Thompson’s depiction of the  mind reposing, “awake and alert, in the sheer
‘luminosity' of consciousness (its quality of non-reflective and open awareness), without
attending exclusively to any particular object or content”, is  a form of desire and intentionality in
that in simple self-reflexive  awareness,  it is at every moment  relating to  a new object (its own
changing sense of non-objectifying awareness of the arising and passing away of temporary
forms), and being affected, disturbed,  by it. Disturbance, desire and dislocating becoming is
prior to, that is, implicit but  not noticed  in ‘neutral’ compassionate awareness.
Compassion is at the same time the violation of a previous relation. Sense is always determined
by the particularity of the phenomenon itself( the thing itself ). The basis of our awareness of a
world isn’t simply relational co-determinacy, but the experience of motivated, desiring
CHANGE in relational co-determinacy.  For Husserl and Merleau-Ponty, every moment of return
to the thinking of totality conjures a different affect and a slightly different motivated meaning of
the  whole. Feelings of compassion and benevolence belong to an infinite spectrum of always
changing  affectivities of positive and negative valence. Phenomenal awareness as transition
from one kind of relational unity to another can just as well be malevolent as benevolent. Within
the range of kinds of relationality, a particular phenomenal awareness may be a lessening of
compassion or a strengthening of it. We can not say it is always benevolent, only that it  is always
a new sense of the correlational, that it is never without co-determinacy.  Becoming is the restless
anxiety of desire, striving, motivation, and the ground of all affect and valuation. Primordial
awareness  is from moment to moment  a new way of  being -affected-by the world, and  thus,
what ever else it is affectively in its particular and contingent exxperieince of ‘now’,  a kind of
astonished terror.
I’ll conclude with these thoughts from Heidegger concerning the complex affective basis  of
fundamental awareness as thrownness and transit:
“Thus thrown in this throw, man  is a transition, transition as the fundamental essence of
occurrence. Man is  history, or better, history is man. Man is enraptured in this transition and
therefore essentially 'absent'. Absent in a fundamental sense-never simply at  hand, but absent in
his essence, in his essentially being away, removed into essential having been and
future-essentially absencing and never at hand, yet  existent in his essential absence. Transposed
into the possible, he must constantly be mistaken concerning what is actual. And only because he
is thus  mistaken and transposed can he become seized by terror. And only where there  is the
perilousness of being seized by terror do we find the bliss of astonishment-being torn away in
that wakeful manner that is the breath of all philosophizing.”
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